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Developing a Relational Law of Contracts: Striking a Balance between Abstraction and 
Contextualism 
Zoe Gounari* 
Abstract 
Relational contract theory holds that the interpretation of a contract must take full account of 
the context and surrounding circumstances of the parties’ bargain so as to give effect to their 
respective intentions. This paper argues that if a relational treatment of contracts is to be 
institutionalised, in the sense of being utilised in a contract dispute to determine and give effect 
to the parties’ intentions, then it must operate at an abstract level. That is to say, rather than 
using relevant context to determine what the actual parties intended in the circumstances at 
hand, the contextualist enquiry should ascertain the relevant context by reference to what the 
parties would have agreed to in the circumstances, had they properly reflected on what their 
self-interest requires. I discuss the merits of this proposition by reference to a number of 
appellate judgments, which already endorse contextualism as a response to contractual 
ambiguity, and I ultimately apply it to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Rainy Sky SA v 
Kookmin Bank. 
1. Introduction 
The ‘relational contract’ recently became the basis for controversy in English contract law,  
when Lord Leggatt, sitting at first instance, relied on this concept to justify implying a duty of 
good faith into an oral contract between two highly sophisticated parties.1 The contract 
concerned a joint venture formed between an investor and a hotelier for the purpose of buying 
and developing a number of luxury hotels in Greece. The learned judge identified the joint 
venture as a paradigmatic relational contract, because it was informal, yet required a high 
degree of cooperation between the parties and, as such, gave rise to mutual expectations of 
confidence and trust so as to achieve the venture’s common objective.2 These expectations 
could only be given legal effect, he reasoned, if a duty could be implied into the contract 
requiring the parties to conduct the joint venture’s affairs in good faith. To be sure, Lord 
Leggatt’s conclusion as to good faith and its place in the performance of such contracts was 
controversial in its own right, not least because it contradicted established contract law 
                                                          
* Durham University, Durham, UK; I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers and those who have read and 
commented on earlier drafts of this article, particularly Chris Riley, Matthew Nicholson and Shaun Pattinson, as 
well as the participants of the Private Law Consortium, which took place at Bar Ilan University, Tel Aviv, between 
3-4 June 2019. All errors are mine. 
1 Al Nehayan v Kent [2018] EWHC 333 (Comm). 
2 Ibid, at [174], building on his argument in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp [2013] EWHC 111 
(Comm). 
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orthodoxy, which tends to treat contract parties as adversaries and even has a place for 
opportunistic breaches of contract pursuant to strategies of ‘efficient breach’. To my mind, 
however, the controversy does not lie in the nature of the implied duty, but in the starting 
premise of the learned judge’s reasoning – the relational contract. For one, an attempt to rely 
on relational contract jurisprudence for the purpose of implying terms into existing contracts 
had previously been dismissed in the Court of Appeal for lack of certainty.3 Yet, Al Nehayan 
was the latest in a string of High Court cases,4 indicating that the concept of a relational contract 
has transcended the realm of abstract theory and become the basis of applied judicial reasoning 
with some persuasive, if not outright precedential, force. 
If this is correct, the key question is: how should the tenets of relational contract theory be 
implemented by the courts? The purpose of this article is to set out an interpretative framework 
by which to operationalise relational contract law. I argue that relational contract theory 
provides the essential means by which to rationalise the application of contract law, in the sense 
of bringing it in line with its own declared objective of giving effect to the parties’ reasonable 
expectations. However, in contrast to most relational contract theorists, I argue that the 
relational methodology should be implemented at an abstract level. That is to say, the relational 
methodology should be used to establish what a reasonable economic agent would have 
intended in the parties’ circumstances (objective level), rather than what the actual parties 
intended in those circumstances (subjective level). In order to more accurately ascertain the 
intentions of such an agent, I argue that contract law should rely on the relational methodology 
to recalibrate its presumptions on the nature of the reasonable agent. To do this, contract law 
must take into account the circumstances surrounding the contract and shaping the dispositions 
of the agents at its core. This is a marked departure from relational theory proper, which, in 
contrast to current legal orthodoxy, advocates absolute contextualism in the interpretation of 
contracts. Nevertheless, I consider my argument to be distinctly relationalist because it stems 
from the fundamentally relational concept of viewing the contract as a collaborative 
undertaking first and foremost, rather than as a transaction between adversaries. 
My argument and proposed interpretative framework are based on three presumptions, which 
I set out below. For the first two, I will provide only outline justifications as they appear in the 
law, while, in the next section, I will expand on and justify the third. The first of these 
presumptions is that the objective of contract law is to give effect to the reasonable expectations 
of the parties,5 given that ascertaining their intentions at the time of contracting is the 
paramount undertaking in English contract law.6 This is evidenced by the requirement that the 
parties must have intended the creation of legal relations before a contract can be said to have 
                                                          
3 Baird Textile Holdings Ltd. v Marks & Spencer Plc. [2001] EWCA Civ 274 (discussed in detail below). 
4 Globe Motors v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 396; D&G Cars Ltd v Essex Police 
Authority [2015] EWHC 226 (Comm); Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd [2014] EWHC 
2145 (Comm); Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp [2013] EWHC 111 (Comm). 
5 See the relevant discussion in J Steyn, ‘Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men’ 
(1997) LQR 433. 
6 See eg Couturier v Hastie [1856] 5 HLC 673, in the context of goods having perished at the time of the 
contract. 
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come into existence.7 Furthermore, the primary statute on the commercial sale of goods, the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979, for the most part defers to the intentions of the parties to determine 
whether certain statutory provisions will apply to the contractual relationship and, if so, how.8 
The second presumption is that the law’s understanding of rationality is that it lies in the pursuit 
of one’s self-interest (within the bounds of the law). This is amply illustrated by Lord Ackner’s 
famous statement in Walford v Miles, in response to counsel arguing that contractual bargaining 
must be done in good faith when the defendants defected on an agreement to exclusively 
negotiate with the claimant for the sale of a company:  
‘The concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to 
the adversarial [sic] position of the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party 
to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids 
making misrepresentations.’9 
My third presumption is that all contracts, no matter their type, length or subject matter, are 
relational at their core. The impact of this presumption is twofold. First, it renders a relational 
interpretation of contract law immediately operable; contract law need not amend its 
fundamental tenets, but merely recalibrate its application of them. Secondly, it entails that a 
relational interpretation of contracts is more apt to determine and give effect to the parties’ 
reasonable expectations than the current legal orthodoxy, which treats the context informing 
the relationship between the parties relevant only in cases of contractual ambiguity.10 I expand 
on and justify this point in the next section. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In the next section, I set out the basic tenets of 
relational contract theory and contrast its methodology to that of the current legal orthodoxy. 
In the third section I set out the practical and theoretical limitations of the relationalist approach 
and argue that these limitations of absolute contextualism render the operationalisation of 
relational contract theory impractical beyond a purely procedural level. In the final section, I 
set out an interpretative framework which examines how rational agents would reason in the 
broader context in which the contractual relationship operates, if they had properly reflected 
on what their self-interest requires. 
                                                          
7 Esso Petroleum Limited v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1975] UKHL 4; Jones v Padavatton [1968] 
EWCA Civ 4; Errington v Wood [1951] EWCA Civ 2; and see London and Regional Developments Ltd. v TBI 
plc. [2002] EWCA Civ 355, [38]. 
8 Ample examples are ss 17, 19 and 20 of the Sale of Goods Act, to the effect that property and risk in goods is to 
pass when the parties intend it to pass. 
9 [1992] 2 AC 128, 138E. 
10 Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36; and see the relevant discussion in sections 3 and 4 below. 
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2. Relational Contracts – a brief Background 
The relational theory of contract defines contract as ‘exchange relations’,11 namely ‘relations 
among people who have exchanged, are exchanging, or expect to be exchanging in the 
future’,12 and upon the relationship13 created by an exchange of promises between two or more 
individuals. It is this relationship, which distinguishes this exchange from those which are 
‘discrete’, namely bargains made on an one-off basis and are deemed concluded,14 where 
performance of the parties’ respective obligations is completed on the spot or at a specific 
future point.15 A contract, which creates a relationship beyond the elementary interaction 
necessary16 for the one-off exchange and performance of mutual promises, is a ‘relational 
contract’.17 On this foundation, relational contract theory holds that when the law undertakes 
to construe and enforce a relational contract, it must take into account the (social, cultural and 
financial) context of the parties’ bargain as well as its surrounding circumstances, so as to 
properly comprehend the relationship and give effect to the parties’ intentions. On this view, 
therefore, the formal contract between the parties is only one of the factors that determine the 
parties’ respective rights and duties.  
The relational theory of contracts developed as a response to the perceived failings of classical 
contract law,18 which holds the parties’ express bargain as paramount. Thus, for the purpose of 
construing and giving effect to the bargain, where the contractual language is clear and 
unambiguous, classical theory excludes the surrounding circumstances and the parties’ 
subjective intentions or understanding at the time of contracting,19 unless these factors are made 
relevant by being expressly referred to in the agreement itself. Instead, the bargain’s 
surrounding context is only relevant where the contractual language is ambiguous and creates 
                                                          
11 I Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries’ (2000) 94 NWULR 877, p 877. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See M Eisenberg, ‘Relational Contracts’ in J Beatson and D Friedman (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract 
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) p 291; but note: Eisenberg does not define ‘relationship’ beyond the term’s 
everyday meaning and therefore he does not attempt to distinguish when a ‘relationship’ borne out of a series of 
discrete exchanges, as per the facts of Baird, above n3, gives rise to legally binding rights and duties, if at all. 
14 See eg the definition of the paradigmatic discrete transaction in V Goldberg, ‘Toward an Expanded Economic 
Theory of Contract’ (1976) 10(1) J Econ Issues 45, p 49. 
15 Specificity, either of timing or other performance-related characteristics, being a major characteristic of 
‘complete’ contracts: eg see the analogy in G Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of 
Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 42 Stan L Rev 927. Cf C Goetz and R Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’ 
(1981) 67 Va L Rev 1089, p 1091. 
16 Eg another defining characteristic of a relational contract is that of extended interdependence: L Komhauser, 
‘Book Review: The Resurrection of Contract’ (1990) 82 Colum L Rev 184, p 188. 
17 To be sure, this is an unfairly simplistic account of relational contracts and is presented here in these terms for 
the sake of brevity. It should be noted that, if anything, the most debated and problematic issue in relational 
contract theory lies in the very definition of a relational contract: see R Speider ‘The Characteristics and 
Challenges of Relational Contracts’ (2000) 94 NWULR 823. 
18 Eg I Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational 
Contract Law’ (1978) 72 NWULR 854 [hereafter, Macneil (1978)]. 
19 Eg Arnold v Britton, above n 10, where the Supreme Court considered the interpretation of wording concerning 
a service charge in a 99-year lease. 
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competing, but plausible,20 interpretations.21 The purpose of this approach is to ensure that 
when called upon to construe and enforce the agreement, the law does not unduly interfere with 
the parties’ fundamental freedom ‘to contract as they may see fit’22 by taking account of 
irrelevant factors. Subject to some well-defined limitations, this freedom applies with respect 
to all contracts apart from those whose subject matter is governed by a specific statutory regime 
(such as contracts for the conveyance of land, insurance, employment, consumer credit, etc.).  
There are two principal consequences of classical contract theory in practice. First, as regards 
the enforceability of the contract, unless there is a defect in the bargaining process (such as 
fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, duress or undue influence) which would undermine the 
validity of the parties’ consent to the bargain,23 courts do not have a general power to alter a 
contract, for instance, in order to address a fundamental change in the circumstances of the 
original bargain.24 Neither can they refuse to enforce an otherwise valid contract (ie where 
there are no questions as to the capacity of the parties or the legality of the subject matter), 
even where its effect is unreasonable or unconscionable.25 In the words of Jessel MR: 
‘if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of 
full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and 
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and 
shall be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy 
to consider – that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract’.26 
The second practical consequence of classical contract theory concerns the parties’ 
performance of the contract. Thus, when performing their respective obligations, generally 
speaking, the parties cannot deviate from what the contract specifies. Any such deviation would 
technically amount to a breach of the contract and expose the ‘non-performing’ party to liability 
in damages. For example, in Arcos v Ronaasen,27 the House of Lords upheld the buyer’s strict 
right to reject goods for not complying with their description in the contract, despite their only 
negligible deviation from the contract specification. The case concerned an agreement for the 
sale and transport of Russian timber to an English buyer, who intended to use the goods for the 
construction of cement barrels with the seller’s knowledge of this. The agreement stipulated 
the length, breadth and thickness of the staves to be delivered, and allowed for variation of the 
                                                          
20 On this point, see Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17. 
21 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank, discussed below. 
22 Suisse Atlantique Société D’Armement Maritime SA v Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361, p 399D, 
per Lord Reid. 
23 See National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686, p 708. 
24 See British Movietonews Ltd v London and District Cinemas Ltd [1952] AC 166. 
25 Ibid, in the context of exclusion or exemption clauses; Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] 
AC 827, p 848. On the implication of terms into a contract: The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64, p 68 and Luxor 
(Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] AC 108, p 137. Cf Ingham v Emes [1955] 2 All ER 740, where the Court 
effectively invented a good faith obligation in order to deny a frivolous claimant a remedy. 
26 Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq. 462, p 465. 
27 [1933] AC 470; Cf Cehave NV v Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.h. (The Hansa Nord) [1976] QB 44. 
 6 
breadth and length of the staves, but not of their thickness, stipulated at a half inch. The staves 
the seller sought to deliver deviated from that specification by various degrees but in every 
case no more than a fraction above or below the specified half inch. Regardless, the buyer 
sought to reject the goods outright. The matter was referred to an umpire who determined that 
the staves were still suitable for the construction of barrels and, when shipped, the timbers had 
been merchantable under the agreed specification. When the issue reached the House of Lords, 
it was held that the buyer was entitled to demand goods answering the description in the 
contract. According to Lord Buckmaster,  
‘If the article they have purchased is not in fact the article that has been delivered, they 
are entitled to reject it, even though it is the commercial equivalent of that which they 
have bought’.28  
In other words, with respect to the performance of contractual obligations, classical contract 
theory translates into a regime of strict liability. 
By contrast, relational theory holds that classical contract law is too rigid in its interpretation 
of the contract and its insistence on upholding the bargain as recorded in the parties’ express 
agreement (if present) fails to take into account their actual contractual behaviour, which tends 
to evolve beyond the confines of what is prescribed in the agreement itself.29 Classical contract 
law also fails to address the problem of ‘incomplete presentiation’,30 namely the fact that it is 
impossible for the parties to contract in the present about every eventuality that befalls their 
relationship in the future. This is because, as Beale puts it, classical contract law tends to treat 
‘the contract in an abstract way, taking little account of the context in which it is made’.31  
On the other hand, relational theory advocates absolute contextualism. In Hillman’s words, 
‘the thrust of relationalism is its description of reality’.32 Thus, the relationalist approach has 
no use for an a priori framework by which the court is to impute a set of expectations onto the 
parties, based on what a reasonable person in the parties’ position would have intended, as is 
the case with the current legal position. This is because if an examination of the context 
                                                          
28 Ibid, p 474. 
29 See I Macneil, ‘Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know’ (1985) Wis L Rev 483; For an economic 
perspective, see Goldberg, above n 14, Cf I Macneil, ‘Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky’ (1982) 
68(5) Va L Rev 947 [hereafter, Macneil (1982)]. 
30 ‘Presentiation’ being defined as the parties’ attempt ‘to bring all the future relating to [the transaction] into the 
present, or . . ., to presentiate. [The parties] can then deal with the future as if it were in the present’; I Macneil, 
The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1980), 19 [hereafter, ‘Macneil (1980)’]. For a general discussion of the ‘incomplete presentiation’ problem, see 
D Campbell and J Harris ‘Flexibility in Long-term Contract Relationships: the Role of Cooperation’ (1993) J L 
& Soc'y 166, p 169. 
31 H Beale, ‘Relational Values in English Contract Law’ in D Campbell, L Mulcahy and S Wheeler (eds), 
Changing Concepts of Contract: Essays in Honour of Ian Macneil (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 116, 
p 117. 
32 R Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law: An Analysis and Critique of Contemporary Theories of Contract 
Law (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1997) p 265. 
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informing the parties’ relationship so warrants, a relational interpretation of contract rules 
could well afford the injured party with an appropriate remedy where the bargain is incomplete 
on that front or, theoretically, even where no express bargain had been previously hammered 
out.33 In other words, the relationalist’s argument is that interpreting contracts through a 
universally applicable lens, which is by definition what the current objective legal framework 
entails, is cumbersome and ignores the reality of the parties’ relationship and actual intentions. 
Thus, in the event of a dispute, the parties can be reasonably expected to settle their differences 
through negotiation and compromise, rather than through formal means.34 But should attempts 
at an amicable solution fail, the court can and should settle the dispute by examining the 
specific circumstances underlying the parties’ agreement and the overall context informing 
their relationship. Rather than attempting to regulate the conduct of contractual parties (for 
instance, in an attempt to protect the vulnerable following an unforeseen, or inadequately 
planned for, relationship-altering event) through an a priori framework, the interests of 
commercial actors would be better served by giving effect to their bargain as informed by the 
circumstances specific to each relationship. This approach, therefore, affords the parties and 
the courts the flexibility necessary to address one important empirical observation: the more 
‘relational’ the exchange the more unlikely it is that the parties will have planned and allocated 
risks effectively.35 
In the same vein, relational theory can arguably provide an effective solution to the problem of 
opportunistic behaviour, which for instance inevitably faces rational commercial parties 
involved in a long-term collaborative relationship. Insisting on the importance of subjectivity, 
relational contract theory holds that ex hypothesi each case must be examined on its own facts 
and the application of contract law, as well as the award of any remedies, must reflect the 
context of the particular relationship.36 Thus, should a contractual relationship break down as 
a result of opportunism, the relational interpretation of the agreement would take into account 
both the specific circumstances underlying the agreement and the overall context of the 
relationship. On this basis, the court would be better placed to identify actions as opportunistic, 
which from a classical contract point of view might have been treated as both reasonable and 
                                                          
33 Which should also correspond to the relational characteristics of the contract at issue and therefore the needs of 
the parties – see Macneil (1982), above n 29.  
34 See eg S Macaulay ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28(1) Am Soc Rev 
55 and H Beale and T Dugdale, ‘Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies’ 
(1975) 2 Brit J L & Soc'y 45. See also Crystal’s survey of cases brought under article 2 of the United States 
Uniform Commercial Code (which imposes inter alia a duty of good faith on parties to commercial contracts and 
includes ‘past dealings’ as a factor to be considered in the interpretation of such contracts – a distinctly relational 
approach) demonstrating that the majority of litigated cases over a period of two decades involved ‘discrete’ 
contracts: N Crystal, ‘An Empirical View of Relational Contracts Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial 
Code’ (1988) Ann Surv Am L 293, p 299.  
35 In contrast to the values in operation when the exchange is on the ‘discrete’ side of the spectrum: see also I 
Macneil, ‘Values in Contract: Internal and External’ (1983) 78 NWULR 340 [hereafter, Macneil (1983)]. 
36 Note eg Macneil’s critique of the objective theory of contract (as applied in classical and neo-classical contract 
law) whereupon the parties’ necessary consent to the contract terms is deduced not from reality but from ‘objective 
manifestations of intent’, rendering the whole established approach to consent fictitious: see I Macneil, ‘Contracts: 
Adjustment of Long-term Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 
NWULR 854, pp 883-884. Cf R Barnett ‘Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil’s Relational Theory of 
Contract’ (1992) 78 Va L Rev 1175, pp 1189-1190. 
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foreseeable (and thus preventable through relevant provision in the agreement).37 Therefore, a 
relational application of contract law would be better placed overall to distinguish, according 
to context, between opportunism and fair dealing, and thus protect the vulnerable party and 
deter truly opportunistic behaviour in a contract, because its subjective approach would more 
accurately reflect the reality of the relationship.38 
Against this background, I contend that contract law should operate on the presumption that, 
as Eisenberg argues, all contracts are at least to some extent relational,39 in the sense that the 
relational values which made the bargaining process possible in the first place must be 
understood to continue to permeate the contract throughout its lifecycle. At first blush, a 
proposition which regards all contracts as relational goes against the dominant presumption 
regarding the nature of the contracting parties as self-interested agents, and therefore 
adversaries. Yet, at its core, contract is a relationship, albeit one with legal force, and requires 
the parties’ adherence to values conducive to a relationship not only for it to come about in the 
first place, but also for it to be successfully completed down the line. I define these values as 
‘relational’, because they are a necessary condition for a relationship between presumed 
rational agents to even be contemplated. In the context of the contract, such values must at least 
include an expectation of honesty, with respect to what the parties have and are willing to offer; 
and an expectation of reciprocity, in the sense that each party will be obtaining something they 
value out of the relationship in exchange for sacrificing something else. Indeed, the expectation 
of honesty is manifestly operationalised in the doctrines of misrepresentation and, indirectly, 
mistake, while as Macneil points out,40 the concept of reciprocity has been effectively 
institutionalised as the doctrine of consideration, which is the very cornerstone of contract law. 
In short, the values underlying contract as an institution are fundamentally relational. 
Therefore, relational theory presents no definitional limitations for its operationalisation 
because its core tenets are already present within classical contract law itself. 
But why are these core values relational? I contend that the answer lies in contract law’s 
understanding of rationality as the pursuit of self-interest. In this light, a rational agent would 
only agree to transact with another equally rational agent, where the latter has signalled that 
they will be complying with the terms of the bargain, otherwise the former risks losing both 
the resource they are willing to sacrifice and the resource they seek to obtain through the 
bargain. The parties’ willingness to sacrifice a resource for the purposes of the bargain amounts 
to a self-imposed constraint on the pursuit of their respective self-interest. What follows from 
this is that the existence of any contract presupposes that both parties have, at least initially, 
agreed to constrain the pursuit of their self-interest in the context of the agreement. In other 
words, the existence of a contract presupposes the existence of two rational agents who have 
agreed to cooperate, in the sense of mutually and voluntarily constraining their conduct, long 
                                                          
37 Cf J Adams and R Brownsword, Key Issues in Contract (London: Butterworths, 1995), pp 229-230, observing 
that the opportunism displayed by the plaintiff in Arcos v Ronaasen was not recognised as bad faith. The facts in 
Baird, above n 3, are a good example of this.  
38 See eg O Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ (1979) 22 J 
Law Econ 233; I Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contract’ (1974) 47 S Cal L Rev 691. 
39 M Eisenberg, ‘Why There is no Law of Relational Contracts’ (2000) 94 NWULR 805, pp 813-817. 
40 Macneil (1983), above n 35, p 347. Similarly, Campbell identifies as distinctly relational the obligation on a 
claimant in a contract dispute to mitigate the loss suffered as a result of the defendant’s breach: D Campbell, ‘A 
Relational Critique of the Third Restatement of Restitution §39’ (2011) 68 Wash & Lee L Rev 1063, p 1067. 
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enough to achieve the objectives which drive the bargain, however short or discrete the 
transaction. 
Thus, the third presumption upon which my argument is based may be formulated as follows: 
all contracts, regardless of duration or level of co-dependence between the parties, are 
relational to some degree; and this necessarily impacts contract law’s understanding of the 
nature of a rational contractual party, not merely as an agent who pursues their own self-interest 
in the context of a bargain, but as an agent who has agreed to cooperate as a means of achieving 
that objective. Consequently, the relational interpretation of contracts should not be confined 
to those contracts which the law treats as quintessentially ‘relational’, in the sense of 
establishing an ongoing relationship of mutual reliance, such as the contractual joint ventures 
which Lord Leggatt addressed in both Yam Seng and Al Nehayan. Instead, the relational 
interpretation of contract should be introduced into the current legal framework by simply 
having classical contract law be re-interpreted contextually, in light of the relational norms that 
made the contract possible in the first place, so as to avoid the kind of, arguably, anomalous 
outcomes achieved in cases like Arcos v Ronaasen.41 
In Arcos, it will be remembered, the House of Lords ruled that goods sold under a contractual 
specification must correspond to that specification absolutely, which was itself a condition 
implied into the contract by s.13 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (hereafter, SGA1893), then in 
force. Their Lordships expressly disregarded the relevant industry standards, as evident in the 
findings – on two occasions – of an industry umpire. Campbell argues that by doing so their 
lordships dismissed the relevance of context crucial to the interpretation of the agreement.42 
The effect of this was that their Lordships reversed the default standard in sale of goods from 
that of goods having to be of merchantable quality or fit for the purpose for which they were 
sold (already guaranteed by s.14 SGA1893) to that of goods having to absolutely correspond 
to their description in the contract (s.13). To be sure, Campbell does not disagree with a buyer 
being guaranteed absolute correspondence with the goods’ contractual description, and 
therefore having the automatic right to reject them if that guarantee is breached, so long as the 
buyer has paid for such privilege.43  
Therein lies the anomaly. A legal regime which claims to track market norms and values cannot 
expect sellers to guarantee absolute correspondence with the goods’ description as a default 
without contradicting its own terms.44 This is because such expectation would lead to higher 
manufacturing costs, as suppliers would scramble to comply with the high standard of 
contractual performance, leading to higher prices, which in turn would be unacceptable to 
classically defined rational buyers. If given the choice, the latter would reasonably be expected 
to opt to pay less for goods that, on the one hand, do not correspond with their description 
absolutely, but, on the other, are guaranteed to be fit for the purpose they were bought, or, at 
the very least, to be of merchantable quality. Campbell’s ultimate point is that if the judges in 
                                                          
41Above n 27. 
42 D Campbell, ‘Arcos v Ronaasen as a Relational Contract’ in D Campbell, L Mulcahy and S Wheeler (eds), 
Changing Concepts of Contract: Essays in Honour of Ian Macneil (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 138 
[hereafter, Campbell (Arcos)] 
43 Ibid, p 162. 
44 Cf R Barnett, ‘The Sound of Silence: Contractual Defaults and Contractual Consent’ (1992) 78 Va L Rev 821. 
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Arcos had properly considered the dispute in light of the context in which it was made in the 
first place, they would have concluded that the buyer did not in fact have the right to reject the 
goods outright, because the goods substantially corresponded to their description as per the 
default standard as to correspondence set by s.14. Making s.13 SGA1893 the default would be 
contradicting the purposes of the legal regime itself. Therefore, there are distinct advantages in 
a contextualist interpretation, even of ‘discrete’ contracts, in the sense that the undertaking of 
interpretation ultimately reflects more accurately the policy objectives of the law as declared.  
 
3. Limitations of contextualism 
In the previous section, I sought to establish that by relying on the presumption that all contracts 
are to some extent relational, injecting the contextualist methodology of relational theory into 
classical  contract law is not only theoretically and practically plausible within the current legal 
framework, but also essential, so as to bring the operation of contract law in line with its own 
declared objectives. However, the relational methodology must be heavily qualified, because, 
as I argue in this section, relational theory’s insistence on absolute contextualism has severe 
limitations. I demonstrate this by examining in detail a number of cases where contextualism 
was held to be key in the court’s decision, yet the process by which their Lordships determined 
the context relevant to the court’s inquiry was opaque at best and arbitrary at worst. The first 
of these cases, Baird Textiles v Marks & Spencer, is one which relational theorists hail as a 
missed opportunity for the court to apply relational theory outright. The second and third cases, 
Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society and Mannai Investments 
Co v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co respectively, are those which established and formalised 
contextualism as a response to contractual ambiguity. Each of these cases represents a distinct 
approach to contextualism, in the sense that in each case the court uses a different framework 
by which to determine which context is relevant to the task of interpretation. Thus, in the first, 
the relevant context is determined by the case’s own factual matrix, while in the second and 
third, the context is determined by reference to business common sense and industry practice 
respectively. I argue that every one of these approaches, on its own, is problematic. Ultimately, 
this section seeks to demonstrate that relying on absolute contextualism to ascertain the parties’ 
reasonable expectations without an a priori, unifying framework by which to determine what 
context is relevant to the inquiry, will produce either arbitrary or simply un-replicable results, 
in the sense that every case will be distinguished on its own facts. I set out my proposed 
interpretative framework in the final section of this article, where I apply it to the judgment in 
Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank, where the Supreme Court crystallised its approach to 
contextualism based on the principles set out in Investors Compensation and Mannai 
Investments.  
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a) Case 1: Determining the Parties’ Reasonable Expectations solely by Reference to the 
Case’s Factual Matrix 
The problem with implementing relational contract theory in its most contextualist form is 
evident in Baird Textile Holdings v Marks & Spencer.45 The case concerned Baird Textiles 
(Baird), a decades-long supplier of retailer Marks and Spencer (M&S). Baird had been 
supplying textiles to M&S for 30 years. Their arrangement was not based on an express long-
term contract to that effect, but on M&S placing its orders with Baird in advance of every retail 
season every six months. After a total 60 orders, M&S notified Baird that it would place no 
more orders with them. Baird sued, claiming inter alia that there was an overarching implied 
contract between Baird and M&S, which required the latter to provide Baird with reasonable 
notice, before it ended their relationship, one so close that even the CEO of M&S had described 
as ‘symbiotic’. Baird calculated the period of reasonable notice at 3 years and justified the 
amount of time on the basis that it was necessary to allow Baird to disentangle its affairs from 
those of M&S. Indeed, over the preceding three decades M&S had come to be involved 
intimately in, and on many occasions even determine, Baird’s most crucial business decisions, 
eg with regard to plant expansion, investment in specialised machinery and even the identity 
of Baird’s other clients. M&S’s response was that in the absence of an express long-term 
contract, its legal relationship to Baird consisted of 60 separate, albeit consecutive, contracts 
and, therefore, any obligation to Baird begun with the placement of each order and ended with 
its completion. Affirming the High Court’s decision at first instance, the Court of Appeal held 
that despite the ample evidence of co-dependency in the parties’ relationship, the fact remained 
that, as with an implied contract term, an entire contract can only ever be implied as a matter 
of necessity and that, in this case, any such attempt would be impossible anyway for lack of 
certainty.46  
How is the court to decide on the actual content of an agreement, with a view to enforcing it, 
when the parties themselves appear to have opposing impressions as to the very nature of their 
relationship? Campbell contends that this is possible by reference to the objective values, which 
informed the relationship and made it possible in the first place.47 This is fair but let us consider 
the context in which those values operated. Baird was a well-established textile manufacturer, 
when M&S chose it to be one of its four major textile suppliers. All the same, the arrangement 
with M&S was especially lucrative for Baird because of M&S’s own widely advertised policy 
with regard to its relationships with its suppliers, namely that the latter could rely on M&S’s 
long-term custom and support in return for complying with M&S’s own stringent 
manufacturing and marketing standards. However, throughout the 30-year relationship 
between the two, M&S resisted signing an express long-term contract with Baird in order to 
retain flexibility in that side of its business. For its part, Baird apparently accepted this risky 
state of affairs in the face of a lucrative arrangement that took over 40% of its output and more 
than doubled its turnover. What should also be relevant here is that the relationship was one of 
co-dependency; M&S had invested in the relationship at least as much as Baird had – if Baird 
                                                          
45Above n 3. 
46 Baird’s second ground, promissory estoppel arising from the long-standing and extremely close relationship 
with M&S, failed on the basis that an estoppel can only be the basis of a defence, rather than a cause of action in 
its own right. 
47 Campbell (Arcos), above n 42. 
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suddenly decided to break from M&S, the latter would have found itself one major supplier 
short and, therefore, in dire straits when it came to satisfying its retail demands. Baird could 
have used this fact to leverage an agreement, which, if nothing else, at least provided for a 
period of notice. My point here is that, Baird’s understandable woes aside, M&S had an equally 
valid claim in terms of context. 
b) Case 2: Determining the Parties’ Reasonable Expectations based on ‘Business 
Common Sense’ 
Of course, examination of the relevant ‘factual matrix’ has long been established as an integral 
part of the task of contract interpretation.48 When, however, this ‘factual matrix’ is to determine 
the reasonable expectations of the contract parties, Brownsword asks ‘relative to what precisely 
is a particular contractor’s expectation “reasonable”?’49 If, for instance, an industry-based 
paradigm of reasonableness becomes the sole compass for determining whether an expectation 
may be enforced, then the problem becomes one of how the industry-established norms are to 
be identified and related to the contract at hand, a task easier said than done. To my mind, this 
type of paradigm, held out as ‘business common sense’, refers to collective intuition, which is 
patently subjective and not necessarily what the rational agent who has decided to constrain 
the pursuit of their self-interest for the purposes of the bargain would have understood to be 
the case. In any event, Brownsword demonstrates the problem of relying on this type of 
paradigm as a guide to the task of contract interpretation through his analysis of the House of 
Lords’ decisions in Investors Compensation Scheme v. West Bromwich Building Society50 and 
Mannai Investments Co v. Eagle Star Life Assurance Co.51  
In Investors Compensation the appellant handled claims by investors who, following the advice 
of independent financial advisers, had mortgaged their homes with certain building societies 
and used the advances to invest in equity-linked bonds. Due to falling equities and escalating 
interest rates, the investors suffered heavy losses and claimed compensation through the 
appellant, as their financial advisers had become insolvent. The appellant was a statutory body 
established pursuant to s.54 of the Financial Services Act 1986 to provide a compensation fund 
for investors with unsatisfied claims against persons authorised under the Act to carry on 
investment business. Crucially, certain losses were excluded from the compensation scheme 
so that the investors were only partially compensated in every case. Here, having compensated 
the investors, the appellant sought to recover from the respondent building society in damages 
for breach of duty in common law and under the 1986 statute. The appellant could do this on 
the basis of a clause in its compensation claim form by which the investors assigned to the 
appellant all rights arising out of the transaction with the financial advisers and any third 
                                                          
48 Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989, p 997. 
49 R Brownsword ‘After Investors: Interpretation, Expectation and the Implicit Dimension of the ‘New 
Contextualism’ in D Campbell, H Collins and J Wightman, Implicit Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, Network 
and Relational Contracts (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) p 105. 
50 [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
51 [1997] AC 749. 
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parties. The clause was, however, subject to an exception in s.3(b) of the appellant’s form, 
whereby the investors retained absolutely the benefits of: 
‘Any claim (whether sounding in rescission for undue influence or otherwise) that you 
have or may have against the West Bromwich Building Society in which you claim an 
abatement of sums which you would otherwise have to repay to that society in respect 
of sums borrowed by you from that society in connection with the transaction and 
dealings giving rise to the claim (including interest on any such sums).’  
Based on this exception, some investors commenced separate proceedings against the 
respondent building society for rescission of their mortgages and damages. Consequently, the 
issue arose as to whether the exception in s.3(b) was restricted to claims in rescission or covered 
any claim the investors may have against the building society seeking to reduce the amount 
repayable to the latter in respect of the mortgage loans, thus rendering the assignment clause 
void, at least with respect to claims against the building society. Being sued by both the 
investors and the appellant, the building society argued that on a simple reading of its wording, 
s.3(b) had to be interpreted in the broader sense, thus rendering the assignment clause void and 
the appellant’s claim groundless. The alternative would be contrary to public policy, for it 
would mean the respondent would end up being sued for the same damages twice. 
A majority of the House of Lords held that, taking account of the context and what a reasonable 
person with knowledge of the context would have understood from the wording of s.3(b),52 the 
latter had to be interpreted as being restricted to claims in rescission. Lord Hoffmann argued 
that, along with the claim form itself, s.3(b) was obviously only meant to be read by lawyers.53 
As laymen, investors were expected to rely on the explanatory note accompanying the claim 
form, paragraph 4 of which made unequivocally clear that the investor was giving up all rights 
against anyone else and transferred them to the appellant. Thus, while it was clearly the only 
document to legally govern the relationship between the investors and the appellant, the claim 
form had to be interpreted in light of the explanatory note.54 Dissenting, Lord Lloyd argued 
that s.3(b) had to be interpreted in the broader sense and that the explanatory note merely added 
to what a reasonable person would already have understood from the claim form itself; namely 
that they were expected to assign all claims but the right to sue the building society in order to 
reduce any outstanding debt on the mortgage.55 Lord Lloyd contended that such a conclusion 
must be obvious in light of the fact that the appellant expressly excluded certain types of claims 
from its compensation scheme, to the effect that it covered only between half and three quarters 
of the amounts claimed by the aggrieved investors.56 In other words, a broader interpretation 
                                                          
52 Above n 50, p 912H-E. 
53 Ibid, p 913H. 
54 Addressing the claim form’s specific reference to the right to rescission, Lord Hoffman explained that this was 
necessary, for an investor who was entitled to rescission of the mortgage (eg if the building society had 
constructive knowledge of undue influence exercised by the financial adviser) or to an abatement of the debt by 
way of rescission, could not assign this right to someone else, in any event: a claim in rescission could only be 
made by the owner of the mortgaged property; ibid, p 916A-F. 
55 Ibid, p 903B-C. 
56 Ibid, p 905C. 
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of s.3(b) must have been what a reasonable investor would have understood and intended when 
they signed the appellant’s claim form, for it would allow them to pursue additional 
compensation, at the very least to cover some of the losses which the appellant would not. 
Furthermore, addressing the respondent’s argument that the commercial consequences of such 
interpretation would be ‘ridiculous’ (ie that in seeking to recover from the respondent – and 
other financial institutions and advisers in similar legal actions – the appellant would 
essentially be competing against the investors), Lord Lloyd observed that while the appellant 
was not a charity, it was also not a commercial organisation; as a statutory body its very essence 
was the compensation of aggrieved investors. In this light, there was nothing commercially 
unreasonable about an agreement providing that investors retain the whole of their rights 
against the respondent building society, while the appellant could recover from virtually 
everyone else involved.57 Therefore, the specific reference to rescission in s.3(b) had to be 
interpreted as merely an example of the options that might be open to individual investors 
against the building societies who provided the mortgages.58 
Ultimately, the debate in Investors Compensation boiled down to the question ‘what context is 
relevant to the task of determining the reasonable expectations of the parties to the specific 
contract at issue’. More importantly, the debate did not revolve around the interpretation of the 
wording in s.3(b) qua wording, but rather of the section’s wording in light of the case’s ‘factual 
matrix’. For the majority, led by Lord Hoffmann, the relevant context began and ended with 
the explanatory note accompanying the appellant’s claim form. A reasonable investor would 
have read it and understood that they were expected to relinquish all rights to claim (apart from 
those arising from rescission). For Lord Lloyd, however, it was also necessary to consider the 
fact that the appellant had expressly excluded certain claims from its remit and that investors 
would only ever be partially compensated as a result. A reasonable investor would have 
understood that they could keep the right to claim at least against the building society, whether 
in rescission or damages. In other words, both sides to the debate were devoted to identifying 
the context that shaped the expectations of the investors.  
However, despite its taking place at the highest level of adjudication, the debate in Investors 
Compensation still does not provide any guidance as to what made the majority’s selection of 
facts from the case’s ‘factual matrix’ more relevant to the dispute, than that of Lord Lloyd’s. 
If anything, I contend that the Supreme Court in Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank59 over a decade 
later supported Lord Lloyd’s reasoning, for it held that where language can be interpreted in 
more than one way the court is entitled to choose the meaning consistent with business common 
sense and exclude all other meaning. My argument here is that if the law purports to be 
consistent with its own tenets, then the task of interpretation must start with the court’s 
understanding of the reasonable person as a rational agent pursuing their self-interest after 
properly reflecting what this requires in the circumstances. In this light, business sense should 
have been understood from the point of view of the reasonable investor, signing the appellant’s 
claim form and having knowledge of the relevant background, which includes the explanatory 
note as well as the appellant’s restrictions in its compensation policy. If this is the case, then 
Lord Lloyd’s reasoning reflects the thought process of the reasonable investor more closely 
                                                          
57 Ibid, p 905E-F. 
58 Ibid, p 902H-903A. 
59 [2011] UKSC 50. 
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than the alternative presented by the majority, because the latter expects the reasonable investor 
to act in accordance with what made business sense for the appellant, which is both improbable 
and contradictory, given the law’s understanding of contractual parties as self-interested agents.  
c) Case 3: Determining the Parties’ Reasonable Expectations based on Industry 
Practice 
Investors Compensation demonstrates that there is an alarming element of arbitrariness in 
determining what context is relevant in the task of ascertaining the reasonable intentions of 
parties to a contract, particularly where the language of the document actually governing the 
dispute is vaguely drafted. Do things improve where the court is afforded a slightly more 
reliable compass, along the lines of, say, industry practice? Brownsword argues that they do 
not,60 as demonstrated in Mannai Investments, where the House of Lords sought to determine 
the reasonable expectations of a commercial person by taking into account standard 
commercial practice. In particular, the House of Lords in Mannai Investments had to consider 
the validity of a notice to terminate two identical 10-year commercial leases, which bore the 
wrong date for termination. In particular, the tenants sought to terminate in accordance with a 
break clause in the leases, which provided them with a single opportunity to terminate the 
leases prior to the expiry of their fixed 10-year term. The break clause required the tenants to 
serve the landlord written notice of no less than six months determining each lease ‘on the third 
anniversary of the term commencement date’, which in this case was 13 January 1995 for both 
(the leases having been signed on 13 January 1992). Unfortunately, in their identical written 
notices the tenants indicated that the date of termination was 12 January 1995. A majority of 
the House of Lords held that the issue was how a reasonable recipient, rather than the landlord 
in this particular case, would have understood the notices, which had to ‘be construed taking 
into account the relevant objective contextual scene’.61 Applying this test, Lord Steyn held that: 
‘a reasonable recipient with knowledge of the terms of the lease and third anniversary 
date (13 January), … would have appreciated that the tenant wished to determine the 
leases on the third anniversary date of the lease but wrongly described it as the 12th 
instead of the 13th. The reasonable recipient would not have been perplexed in any way 
by the minor error in the notices. The notices would have achieved their intended 
purpose.’62 
Lord Steyn then went on to address the long-established argument put forward by Lord Greene 
MR in Hankey v. Clavering that: 
                                                          
60 Brownsword, above n 49, p 113. 
61 Mannai Investments, above n 51, p 767G-H. 
62 Ibid, pp 768H–769A. 
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‘Notices of this kind are documents of a technical nature, technical because they are 
not consensual documents, but, if they are in proper form, they have of their own force 
without any assent by the recipient the effect of bringing the demise to an end.’63  
As such, Lord Greene continued, where they are clear and specific but inaccurate as to a detail, 
such as the date of termination, the court cannot ignore the inaccuracy and substitute the correct 
detail ‘because it appears that the error was inserted by a slip’.64 This is because ‘that would 
not cure the defect because the document was never capable on its face of producing the 
necessary legal consequence’.65 In response, Lord Steyn pointed out that documents of this 
type (commercial contracts and unilateral contractual notices) tend to be construed in a 
commercially sensible way, or how a reasonable commercial person would interpret them, the 
reason for this approach being ‘that it is more likely to give effect to the intention of the 
parties’.66 In other words, the court should reason based on what a person with knowledge of 
commercial practice would have considered reasonable in the circumstances, ie that, here, the 
tenant clearly wished to terminate the leases in accordance with their break clause.  
This is fair, but one must take into account all aspects of commercial practice, lest some 
relevant context is overlooked. So, as Brownsword observes67 and a dissenting Lord Goff 
alludes to,68 it should be relevant to this process that termination clauses in commercial leases 
are often worded in such a convoluted way, precisely so as to make it difficult for the tenant to 
comply. In other words, a commercial person with knowledge of relevant practice would 
recognise such technical documents for the ‘traps’ that they are. Indeed, Lord Goff pointed out 
that all the tenant had to do in order to comply with the break clause was to simply reproduce 
the wording in the clause itself thus avoiding the ‘trap’ altogether.69 Instead, the tenant made a 
reference to a specific date – which turned out to be wrong, for the wording of the break clause 
appeared intentionally vague in that regard. Thus, according to Brownsword and Lord Goff, if 
the objective relevant context was determined by what a commercial person with knowledge 
of the background would consider reasonable, then on Lord Steyn’s reasoning, the notices 
should have been deemed ineffectual.  
With respect, I submit that Lord Steyn’s reasoning in Mannai Investments was ultimately in 
keeping with both business common sense and, to my mind, the industry standard – trap clause 
and all. I contend that if the law is to be consistent with its own declared objectives, then the 
task of interpreting the parties’ intentions ex post must consistently rely on the law’s ex ante 
                                                          
63 [1942] 2 KB 326, pp 329-330. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Mannai Investments, above n 51, p 771A-B, quoting Lord Diplock’s speech in Antaios Compania Naviera SA 
v Salen Rederierna AB [1985] AC 191, p 201: ‘if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of a word in a 
commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business common sense, it must be made to yield 
to business common sense.’ 
67 Brownsword, above n 49, p 114.  
68 Mannai Investments, above n 51, p 759E-G. 
69 Ibid, p 757E-F. 
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presumptions as to the parties’ rational disposition. This gives rise to several logical 
implications. Thus, as I noted in the previous section, if the law is to presume that commercial 
parties are rational first and foremost, then, regarding any bargain whatsoever, it must also 
presume that the parties must have constrained the pursuit of their self-interest at least in the 
context of the bargain. Otherwise, the bargaining process could not take place at all, for the 
parties must understand the other to be adhering to the barest of relational norms, such as 
expectations of honesty and reciprocity, before bargaining with each other can take place.  
Yet, the ‘trap’ clause in Mannai Investments does not reflect a relational norm. Instead, on Lord 
Goff’s view, it is merely an opportunistic ploy designed to catch the tenant out in confusion. If 
this is the case, however, a rational agent who the law must presume has decided to constrain 
the pursuit of their self-interest in the context of the bargain, cannot be regarded as having 
understood the effect of this particular clause to be what was apparently intended by its drafter. 
This is because, the clause, if interpreted the way it was apparently intended by the drafter, 
would simply contradict the norms which allowed the contract between self-interested parties 
to be made in the first place. Thus, this interpretation could not have been what the rational 
agents in question must have intended at the time of contracting. On this view, therefore, Lord 
Steyn’s approach is in keeping with what a rational agent would have intended in the 
circumstances, if they had properly reflected on what their self-interest requires. 
Ultimately, the adjudication process in Mannai Investments, as with Investors Compensation, 
boiled down to the task of choosing one set of facts ostensibly relevant to the dispute over 
another set of facts, arguably, just as relevant to the dispute. There was no clear justification as 
to why Lord Goff’s reasoning failed to satisfy the majority, despite the fact that it was 
consistent with established judicial precedent and, more importantly from a contextualist point 
of view, took account of actual commercial practice, which both sides to the debate accepted 
from the beginning was relevant to the case’s factual matrix. Thus, in the absence of clear 
principle as to what makes certain pieces of the factual matrix relevant to the dispute ex ante, 
it is impossible to instil any certainty in a contextualist adjudication process ex post: the 
outcome will most likely depend on judicial intuition, which is the only way, in my opinion, to 
explain the selection of relevant facts by the majority in both Investors Compensation and 
Mannai Investments. 
4. Introducing a new framework for interpreting the reasonable expectations of 
contractual parties. 
The contextualist approach adopted by the House of Lords in both Investors Compensation and 
Mannai Investments eventually became the status quo in cases where the court is faced with 
two competing interpretations of the same contractual term. Yet, the intuitive nature of the 
process determining what, ultimately, constitutes ‘business common sense’ remains 
unchanged. Thus, in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank the Supreme Court tackled a dispute 
between the buyers of six ships to be constructed by a South Korean company, which became 
insolvent during the contract period, and the latter’s guarantor bank. The appellant buyers had 
agreed to pay the purchase price over six instalments on the condition that the seller’s guarantor 
would refund every instalment, if it transpired that the seller would fail to deliver the ships. 
The condition was recorded in a bond, which set out the events that would trigger the bank’s 
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obligation to issue the refunds but did not include the possibility of the seller’s insolvency in 
that list. The prospect of insolvency, however, was listed in the main contract of sale between 
the appellants and the seller as possible grounds for termination of the contract, upon which 
the buyer would be entitled to be refunded the purchase price. When it transpired that the seller 
had entered insolvency proceedings under Korean law, the buyers sought to enforce the refund 
condition. However, the bank refused to comply on the ground that it was only bound by the 
bond, which made no reference to insolvency as being a trigger for the condition, even though 
it did make reference to ‘all sums due under the contract [of sale]’. The issue then was whether 
the parties had intended the bond to be read in light of the termination clause in the contract of 
sale or whether each document stood on its own strength independent of the other. Palmer LJ 
in the Court of Appeal held that the documents had to be read independently of each other, 
because to do otherwise would be substituting the court’s own understanding of business 
common sense for that of the parties. The Supreme Court, however, held that the bond had to 
be read in the overall context of the contract of sale and its surrounding circumstances. In this 
regard, it was relevant that the buyers’ financiers would have never agreed to finance the 
construction of the ships, had the very real prospect of the seller’s insolvency not been included 
in the circumstances that triggered the refund provisions in the bond. 
While I do not disagree with their Lordships’ conclusion with respect to the interpretation of 
the refund provision, I submit that their ratio placed undue weight to the expectations of the 
buyers and effectively ignored those of the seller. Thus, as with Investors’ Compensation and 
Mannai Investments, the Court’s contextualist analysis relied on the selection of one set of 
relevant facts over another without providing sufficient justification for this choice. I submit 
that this approach, renders the contextualist application of the law unduly arbitrary. Indeed, if 
contract law is to be rational, in the sense of being consistent with its own declared objectives, 
then it must reason from premises that place equal weight on the reasonable expectations of 
both parties, given that the contracting process is a quintessentially collective, if not outright 
collaborative, enterprise, whether viewed from a classical or relational point of view. 
Therefore, when addressing which interpretation of the two documents made ‘good business 
sense’, the Supreme Court should have also taken into account the seller’s reasonable 
expectations rather than rely solely on the buyer’s understanding of the refund condition. To 
my understanding,  the Court omitted this equally relevant set of facts, because despite its 
insistence on the importance of context in determining what a reasonable commercial person 
would have understood as ‘good business sense’, its approach to the contract as an institution 
is that it is inherently adversarial, rather than collaborative. The result appears to be that their 
Lordships feel compelled to choose one party’s interpretation of the facts, over the other’s.  
It is in response to this conundrum that my reimagined relational interpretation of contracts 
may provide a solution. By viewing the contract as an inherently collaborative exercise, the 
Court may make a determination on what constitutes ‘good business sense’ based on what the 
parties must have both understood to be the case when the contract was made. What is novel 
here is that it takes the parties’ common basis for the contractual process and uses it as the 
framework by which to determine which context is relevant in interpreting the parties’ 
intentions at the time the contract was made. I submit that the common basis for commercial 
contracts of any type starts with the parties’ mutual inclination to constrain the pursuit of their 
self-interest in the context of the bargain, in the sense of being willing to sacrifice a resource 
in order to acquire something else in return. This assumption is essential as without it, a bargain 
between self-interested commercial parties, would not be logically possible. Because the law 
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presumes that commercial parties tend to reason from self-interested premises, the process of 
calculating the extent of a sacrifice in the context of the bargain, must be presumed to be 
equally self-interested. In other words, for presumed rational agents to agree to a bargain, the 
bargaining process itself must be presumed to be rational. Thus, the law must presume that 
neither party can have agreed to a bargain by which alone they will be worse off than they 
would have been had there been no bargain at all. Consequently, each party must be presumed 
to have made such concession as would represent the least amount of sacrifice but would return 
the highest possible benefit in the circumstances. It is this method of calculating the parties’ 
respective concessions that I regard as the common basis of any commercial contract. 
In the context of the parties in Rainy Sky, this type of concession would be reflected in the 
buyers’ agreeing to pay the purchase price of the ships in instalments prior to the ships being 
ready for delivery. From the seller’s point of view, this type of concession would be reflected 
in actively agreeing to a refund condition, which must have included the prospect of insolvency 
as one of its triggers, otherwise the buyers’ financiers would never have agreed to provide the 
funds for the construction of the ships so far ahead of delivery being possible. Being a part of 
this industry, the seller must be presumed to have been aware of the risk-averse nature of 
financing banks in making this concession with respect to the refund condition. For both parties 
the benefit obtained from their respective concessions is a number of ships at a presumably fair 
price for the buyers and, for the seller, guaranteed cash flow over a number of months while 
the ships were being constructed. 
I submit that this type of interpretative framework, which identifies the parties’ respective 
concessions as the relevant context informing the court’s inquiry, has two advantages. The first 
is that it addresses the arbitrariness, unpredictability and bias inherent in forming a judgment 
while reasoning from premises that take into account primarily one side’s intentions and 
understanding at the time the contract was made. The second advantage is that it is applicable 
to any type of commercial contract irrespective of class, barring only those contracts which are 
subject to a specific statutory regime (such as consumer, insurance, conveyance and 
employment contracts). To be sure, the process of identifying the parties’ respective 
concessions will be more straightforward in conventionally defined relational or synergistic 
contracts, such as the type of contractual joint venture encountered in Yam Seng and Al 
Nehayan, briefly considered at the beginning of this article. In such cases, the parties’ 
respective concessions are naturally easier to identify, not only because they are often spelled 
out in the agreement itself, but also because the economic and social drivers behind this type 
of contract, such as risk-sharing and resource-pooling, are well-established in both economic 
theory and practice. Rather, this interpretative framework comes into its own when addressing 
the type of contract that ranges from the more synergistic, such as the supply chain in Baird 
Textiles, to the more discrete, such as the supply agreement in Rainy Sky, where the factors 
driving the parties’ respective intentions may well be unique to each party. In such cases, 
seeking to ascertain the parties’ intentions will necessarily lead to bias, because in the context 
of litigation the court is naturally inclined to choose one party’s understanding of events over 
the other’s. The framework proposed here seeks to ascertain the parties’ intentions by reference 
to the contract’s surrounding context as informed by the common basis upon which the parties 
calculated their respective concessions. This allows for a more objective reasoning process, 
which not only reflects the contract’s surrounding context more accurately by taking into 
account of both parties’ relevant understanding and intentions, but also reflects more closely 
the objectives of contract law as declared. 
 20 
5. Conclusion 
The four cases examined above demonstrate the difficulty in authoritatively identifying the 
relevant context, even where all parties involved in the adjudication process are clearly inclined 
to follow a contextualist – rather than literal – approach to the dispute at hand. This, I submit, 
is the most significant limitation of relational contract law, both with respect to the theory itself 
and its practical application. The difficulty stems from the fact that without an objective 
principle to guide the task of interpretation, what determines which context is relevant and how 
it is to be related to the issue at hand ultimately depends on the adjudicator’s intuition, which 
is patently subjective.70 This problem is compounded by the adversarial nature of litigation 
itself, in which the adjudicator is expected to choose one party’s version of events despite the 
fact that by its very nature contract is a collaborative undertaking. This moves the adjudication 
process further away from the declared objective of contract law, which is to give effect to the 
reasonable expectations of the parties at the time the contract was made, namely a time where 
the parties’ priority must have been cooperation rather than competition.  
This is not to say that contextualism on its own can never be a successful paradigm for the 
resolution of contractual disputes.71 It must, however, operate abstractly. For instance, in the 
context of the research and development economy, which features primarily collaboration 
through joint ventures, Jennejohn, dismisses contextualism at the outset, because, on a practical 
level, it tends to focus on trade norms and the course of past dealings between the parties to 
determine their disputes.72 He argues that (a), by definition, the innovation economy does not 
have established trade norms to be used as an interpretation tool, because the innovation 
economy consists in economic agents coming together to create entirely new products, for 
which no market yet exists; and (b) that in a joint venture formed in a market vacuum between 
two parties who have not collaborated before, reliance on the course of their past dealings is 
meaningless, for they tend to deal with issues as they arise. Yet, Jennejohn proposes a novel 
adjudication model for the innovation economy, which is not only fundamentally relational but 
also contextualist. Briefly, this model, which Jennejohn calls ‘experimentalist’, holds that once 
a third-party adjudicator becomes involved (the parties having exhausted all other dispute 
resolution processes set out in their contract), instead of producing a judgment awarding a one-
off remedy to the aggrieved party, the adjudicator establishes an enforcement programme with 
milestones that parties will each be required to meet as appropriate. This is profoundly 
relational because it seeks to preserve the relationship, which through a one-off judgement 
would likely collapse following its enforcement, as it expects the parties to continue addressing 
their issues, albeit with official direction and supervision. Jennejohn’s model is also distinctly 
contextualist, albeit on an abstract level, for it takes into account and addresses the unique 
properties of the innovation economy. 
By contrast, the contextualist albeit objective framework for which I advocate here seeks to 
ascertain the relevant context informing the contract not by reference to each party’s unique 
intentions when examined in a vacuum, but by reference to the common basis upon which the 
parties, as presumed rational agents, must have calculated their respective concessions so as to 
                                                          
70 See the relevant discussion in Lord Hoffmann, ‘Anthropomorphic Justice: The Reasonable Man and his Friends’ 
(1995) 29(2) The Law Teacher 127. 
71 See eg Amlin Corporate Member v Oriental Assurance Corporation [2014] EWCA Civ 1135. 
72 M Jennejohn ‘Contract Adjudication in a Collaborative Economy’ (2010) 5(2) Va L & Bus Rev 173. 
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make the contract possible in the first place. This type of reasoning should apply to every type 
of commercial contract (which is not already governed by a specific statutory regime) 
irrespective of class, duration or degree of co-dependence. Finally, it must be stressed that the 
purpose of a contextualist interpretation of contract cannot be to rectify a bad bargain, but to 
fill in gaps in an incomplete one (where relevant). This is because, fundamentally, the task of 
interpretation seeks to ascertain the (true) intention of the parties at the time of contracting. 
Therefore, for the law to rectify a bad bargain (in the absence of consent-invalidating factors) 
would be to contradict its declared objective, because, bad bargain or not, the parties must have 
intended to make it and such intention warrants being given effect. A case in point is Baird. 
Here, contextualism would not necessarily have assisted the ‘wronged’ party. This is because 
the parties were fundamentally not ad idem with respect to the nature and extent of their 
relationship, with one insisting on a ‘discrete’ relationship structure (having successfully 
created a supply chain of supplier-retailer to its own specification) and the other treating the 
relationship as, essentially, one of partnership. In short, there was no incomplete contract for 
contextualism to rectify, because the demonstrable common objective went only as far as the 
subject matter of each of the orders placed by the retailer to the supplier. Surely, this fact would 
have been relevant to the enquiry as much in terms of context, as it was in terms of classical 
contract theory. 
Thus, when applied on a more abstract level, contextualism can prove indispensable as an 
adjudication tool, which is amply demonstrated by such areas as insurance, construction and 
product liability law, all of which are fields of contract (and tort) law that have been informed 
by the factual similarities of the cases arising in their respective contexts and were developed 
accordingly.73  A relational law of contracts, ought to operate at a similar level of abstraction, 
namely as a default legal structure informed by what the parties would have intended if they 
purported to act rationally, ie if they had properly reflected on what their self-interest requires 
in circumstances where their choices are dependent on the choices of another equally self-
interested agent. That is to say, a fundamentally contextualist approach to contract adjudication 
must be qualified heavily so as to conform to a web of a priori assumptions on the nature and 
behaviour of rational economic agents, if the logical and practical problems it raises are to be 
overcome. 
 
                                                          
73 J Feinman ‘Relational Theory in Context’ (2000) 94 NWULR 737, p 744ff. 
